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We consider the task of sharing a secret quantum state in a quantum network in a verifiable way.
We propose a protocol that achieves this task, while reducing the number of required qubits, as
compared to the existing protocols. To achieve this, we combine classical encryption of the quantum
secret with an existing verifiable quantum secret sharing scheme based on Calderbank-Shor-Steane
quantum error correcting codes. In this way we obtain a verifiable hybrid secret sharing scheme
for sharing qubits, which combines the benefits of quantum and classical schemes. Our scheme
does not reveal any information to any group of less than half of the n nodes participating in the
protocol. Moreover, for sharing a one-qubit state each node needs a quantum memory to store n
single-qubit shares, and requires a workspace of at most 3n qubits in total to verify the quantum
secret. Importantly, in our scheme an individual share is encoded in a single qubit, as opposed
to previous schemes requiring Ω(logn) qubits per share. Furthermore, we define a ramp verifiable
hybrid scheme. We give explicit examples of various verifiable hybrid schemes based on existing
quantum error correcting codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a task, which allows us to securely
split a secret message among n network nodes, in such a
way that at least a certain number of nodes is asked to
collaborate in order to reconstruct the secret. However,
one also requires that a subset with less than a certain
number of nodes cannot gain any information about the
secret. This way one can hide highly confidential and
sensitive information from being exposed, for example
missile launch codes or numbered bank accounts. The
splitting and sharing of the message is often performed
by one designated node – the dealer. If the nodes do not
trust the dealer, but they want a guarantee that a secret
was indeed distributed, then they may wish to verify that
at the end of the protocol there will be one well-defined
secret that they can reconstruct. In this case, the secret
sharing protocol involves an additional step of verifica-
tion of the shares, and one talks about verifiable secret
sharing [1, 2].
Importantly, verifiable secret sharing is used as a sub-
routine for other cryptographic primitives, such as se-
cure multipartite computation [3, 4], byzantine agree-
ment [5], end-to-end auditable voting systems [6] and
atomic broadcast [7]. Likewise, a quantum analogue,
namely verifiable quantum secret sharing (VQSS), is a core
subroutine for secure multiparty quantum computation
[8, 9] and fast quantum byzantine agreement [10]. Veri-
fiable schemes, similarly to their non-verifiable counter-
parts, have the property that they hide information from
a certain number of nodes. That is, any subset with p or
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less nodes does not gain any information about the secret
throughout the protocol. We call this property secrecy.
So far, many protocols have been proposed for sharing
a classical secret using purely classical shares [11–13], us-
ing classical and quantum shares [14–17], as well as for
sharing a quantum secret with quantum shares [14, 18–
22]. This work concerns the last variant, namely schemes
which share a quantum secret. Particularly, through-
out this paper we will consider that the dealer shares a
pure single-qubit state |ψ〉. In this scenario, numerous
schemes for both non-verifiable quantum secret sharing
[14, 18, 19, 21–23] and verifiable quantum secret sharing
[8, 24] are known. Fundamentally, for any scheme shar-
ing a quantum secret with only quantum resources, there
exists a limit to how many nodes p cannot gain any infor-
mation about the secret. This limit is given by p ≤ ⌊n−12 ⌋
and can be intuitively understood as a consequence of the
no-cloning theorem [25]. Indeed, if less than half of the
nodes can reconstruct the secret, then there must exist at
least two groups of nodes able to reconstruct it, which vi-
olates the no-cloning theorem. Moreover, if the majority
of nodes recovers the secret exactly, then the remaining
nodes get no information about the secret (for more de-
tails see [19]). We will refer to schemes which saturate
the above bound on p as schemes with maximum secrecy.
In particular, for VQSS with maximum secrecy, the only
current construction [8] requires that the dimension q
of local shares scales with the number of nodes, q > n.
Therefore, using the existing construction, we cannot find
a non-trivial example of such a VQSS scheme where the
nodes hold single-qubit shares. The reason for this scal-
ing is that, in general, quantum secret sharing schemes
are directly connected to resource-intensive quantum er-
ror correcting codes [18, 19]. Consequently, this leads to
secret sharing schemes which require Ω(log n) of qubits
per share.
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Figure 1. Lifting the secrecy of an n-node secret sharing
scheme of a quantum state, i.e. increasing the value p of nodes
which gain no information about the secret state throughout
the execution of the scheme. Here t denotes the number of
nodes that can perform arbitrary operations on their shares
throughout the protocol, and hence corrupt the secret (active
cheaters).
In the area of non-verifiable quantum secret sharing,
some investigations have been performed to reduce the
number of required qubits, particularly, by exploring
ramp secret sharing schemes [26, 27] and classical encryp-
tion. In a ramp scheme one relaxes the constraint on the
secrecy of the scheme, and therefore, allows some of the
nodes to obtain partial information about the quantum
state. This leads to schemes with less qubits per share.
Additionally, the secrecy of a ramp scheme can be lifted,
i.e. the value of p can be increased by encrypting the
quantum state and then sharing the encryption key via
classical secret sharing, see Figure 1. Such a solution was
dubbed hybrid secret sharing [28–30].
In early stages of quantum network development, it
would be desirable to implement VQSS on a network with
ability to control only a small number of qubits. Since
quantum resources are expensive, a lot of effort is being
put in reducing them in many areas of quantum informa-
tion field, for example quantum computing or quantum
simulation [31–35]. However, reducing the resource re-
quirements in the domain of distributed systems, and in
particular verifiable secret sharing, has not been consid-
ered so far. Here we address the question of whether
a verifiable secret sharing scheme with the maximum
secrecy property (i.e. p =
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
) can be realized on
a quantum network with less qubits. We answer this
question positively by presenting a scheme which reduces
quantum resources necessary for sharing a quantum se-
cret in a verifiable way.
II. RESULTS
Our contribution is three-fold. First, our scheme re-
alizes the task of verifiable secret sharing of a quantum
state using a single qubit per share. Second, we show
that the protocol can be realized in a setting where each
node needs to store n qubits in a quantum memory and
has a workspace of 3n qubits in total to verify the secret.
For comparison, previous protocols [8, 36] require shares
with Ω(log n) qubits and each node having simultaneous
control over Ω(r2n log(n)) qubits for verification, where r
is the security parameter. Finally, our scheme preserves
the maximum secrecy condition. This may enable qubit
reductions for future implementations of cryptographic
schemes, like multiparty computation or byzantine agree-
ment, which use VQSS as a subroutine.
We extend the idea of a hybrid scheme to verifiable
quantum secret sharing. Specifically, we present a proto-
col that achieves the task of sharing a single-qubit quan-
tum state |ψ〉 in a verifiable way, where the dimension
q of individual shares does not grow with the number of
nodes n. In the spirit of [28–30], we make use of classi-
cal verifiable secret sharing [37, 38] in order to obtain a
verifiable hybrid scheme where each node holds at most
3n single-qubit shares at a time during the verification of
the secret, see Outline below. Our scheme has a variety
of consequences. Thanks to the classical encryption of
the quantum state via quantum one-time pad [39], our
protocol can attain maximum secrecy, i.e. p =
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
.
We show that by using a suitable classical scheme, one
can beat the limit of maximum secrecy at the cost of tol-
erating less active cheaters (i.e. nodes that can perform
arbitrary operations on their shares, see Adversary). Fur-
thermore, motivated by non-verifiable schemes, we define
the notion of strong threshold schemes in the context of
verifiability, where any p + 1 nodes can reconstruct the
secret, any p nodes do not gain any information about it,
and t nodes can actively cheat in the protocol. We then
show that according to our definition, it is impossible to
construct a verifiable strong threshold scheme. Finally,
we show how to achieve a ramp hybrid scheme allowing
for sharing secrets in a verifiable way. The security proof
of our protocol expands on the approach suggested in
[8, 36], see Appendix A for details.
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Figure 2. A sketch of a verifiable hybrid secret sharing (VHSS)
protocol for n = 10 nodes denoted N1, . . . , N10, with nq = 7
quantum ( ) and nc = 10 classical (N) shares. The quantum
secret state |ψ〉 of the dealer is encrypted using a classical
key s. The resulting encrypted state σ and the key s are
then distributed by the dealer as quantum and classical shares
respectively.
3Number of nodes. One key ingredient in our re-
source reduction is to combine quantum and classical
resources in a hybrid scheme. In our model, some
nodes hold quantum shares and some nodes hold clas-
sical shares. Note that nodes can have both quantum
and classical shares, see Figure 2. We denote the number
of nodes with classical shares and the nodes with quan-
tum shares by nc and nq respectively, and by n the total
number of nodes.
Adversary. We allow for the existence of t mali-
cious nodes (cheaters) in the protocol. We say that those
cheaters are active, meaning that they can perform arbi-
trary joint operations on their state during the execution
of the protocol, in order to learn |ψ〉. We say that a
protocol tolerates t active cheaters if at the end of the
protocol the reconstruction of the quantum state is pos-
sible despite the presence of those cheaters. The nodes
who follow the protocol exactly are called honest. We
follow the common assumption that the set of malicious
quantum and classical nodes is determined at the begin-
ning of the hybrid protocol and stays fixed throughout
(non-adaptive adversary). We also assume that all nodes
have access to an authenticated broadcast channel [40]
and that each pair of nodes is connected by authenti-
cated, private classical [41] and quantum [42] channels.
Definition 1 ({p, t, n}-VHSS). A {p, t, n}-VHSS verifiable
hybrid secret sharing scheme is an n-node protocol with
three phases: sharing, verification and reconstruction,
and two designated players, dealer D and reconstructor
R. In the sharing phase D shares a pure single-qubit
quantum state |ψ〉 using quantum and classical shares.
In the verification phase all of the nodes verify that the
set of shares defines a unique quantum state. In the re-
construction phase R receives all shares from all nodes,
and reconstructs the unique state defined by these shares.
We require that the scheme satisfies the following require-
ments despite of the presence of t non-adaptive active
cheaters, except with probability exponentially small in
the security parameter r:
• Soundness: if R is honest and D passes the verifi-
cation phase, then there is a unique state |ψ〉 that
can be recovered by R;
• Completeness: ifD is honest then she always passes
the verification phase. Moreover, if R is also honest
then the reconstructed state is exactly D’s state
|ψ〉;
• Secrecy: if D is honest then any group of p ≥ t
nodes cannot gain any information about the secret
before reconstruction.
The parameters of the scheme are determined by an
underlying quantum error correcting code which we use
as a building block. In particular, a relevant variable is
the distance d of the code. We remark that our results
generalize to multi-qubit scenarios.
A. {p, t, n}-VHSS verifiable hybrid secret sharing
protocol.
Outline of the verifiable hybrid secret sharing
(VHSS) protocol (see Protocol 1).
1. Sharing
The dealer D encrypts the secret quantum state |ψ〉
using a classical key s = ab and quantum one-time
pad [39],
σQS =
∑
ab={0,1}2
1
4
XaZb |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ZbXa ⊗ |ab〉〈ab|S
where Q is the quantum register of the dealer
and S is the classical register of the encryption
key. She shares the encrypted state among the
nodes using the quantum protocol and the key s
using the classical protocol, see Protocol 1 “Sharing”.
2. Verification
Nodes verify whether D is honest, i.e. that the
shares held by the nodes are consistent and at the
end of the protocol a state will be reconstructed.
For this, each node encodes the qubit received from
the dealer into further n qubits and sends n − 1 of
them to other nodes. Then, each node uses at most
additional 2n ancilla qubits for one iteration of the
verification procedure. There are O(r2) iterations
of verification, where r is the security parameter. If
the dealer passes the verification phase the protocol
continues. Otherwise it aborts.
3. Reconstruction
One designated node R collects all shares of σ and
reconstructs it. She also reconstructs the classical
key s and decrypts |ψ〉.
Remark. Throughout the protocol each of the
nodes needs to simultaneously store n single-qubit
shares corresponding to the encoded secret state. In
the verification phase each node creates at most 2n
ancilla qubits, performs a joint operation between
these ancillas and the shares of the secret, and then
measures only the ancilla qubits. This means that
the nodes require a workspace of at most 3n qubits
in total for verification.
We revisit the VQSS scheme introduced in [8] and ex-
plore its extension to a verifiable scheme which uses
single-qubit shares. The construction we use is based
on Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) error correcting codes
[45, 46]. Then, we use the existing verifiable classical
secret sharing schemes [37, 38] to combine classical en-
cryption of the quantum secret with the VQSS scheme to
achieve an n-node verifiable hybrid secret sharing scheme
4Number of nodes n
{⌊n−1
2
⌋
, t, n}-VHSS {⌊n−1
2
⌋
, t, t′, n}-ramp VHSS
t = 2 t = 4 t = 1 t = 2
2(t+ 1)2 {8, 2, 18} {24, 4, 50} {8, 1, 1, 18} {24, 2, 2, 50}
3t2 + 3t+ 1 {9, 2, 19} {30, 4, 61} {9, 1, 1, 19} {30, 2, 2, 61}
6t2 + 1 {12, 2, 25} {48, 4, 97} {12, 1, 1, 25} {48, 2, 2, 97}
8t2 + 4t+ 1 {20, 2, 41} {72, 4, 145} {20, 1, 1, 41} {72, 2, 2, 145}
Table I. Examples of verifiable hybrid secret sharing schemes using one qubit shares coming from this work. The secret is
shared among n nodes. A {⌊n−1
2
⌋
, t, n}-VHSS scheme uses shares from all of the nodes to reconstruct the secret, whereas
{⌊n−1
2
⌋
, t, t′, n}-ramp VHSS scheme can reconstruct the secret without any t′ nodes. Both schemes tolerate t active cheaters
and are based on error correcting codes of [43, 44].
(VHSS), see Outline. In {p, t, n}-VHSS the number p of
nodes who cannot gain any information about the quan-
tum state is determined by the classical scheme. More-
over, t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋ cheaters are active and constrained by
the distance d of the underlying CSS code. In our scheme
the secret state of the dealer |ψ〉 is encrypted using quan-
tum one-time pad with a classical key s, and then both
objects are shared and verified in parallel. It is, there-
fore, impossible to reconstruct the quantum secret with-
out reconstructing the classical key. In the case when
n = nq = nc we achieve the following functionalities:
• We construct a scheme which attains maximum se-
crecy using single qubit shares. Specifically, thanks
to using classical encryption, we show that in our
{p, t, n}-VHSS scheme any p ≤ ⌊n−12 ⌋ nodes com-
ing together before reconstructing the secret, do
not gain any information about it. Our {p, t, n}-
VHSS scheme tolerates up to t < n4 active cheaters.
Reconstruction of the secret occurs with all of the
shares.
• We show how to achieve a {p, t, n}-VHSS scheme
for p >
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
by choosing an appropriate classi-
cal verifiable scheme [38]. In this case, however,
there exists a trade-off between the number of ac-
tive cheaters and secrecy, such that n ≥ p+ 3t+ 1.
Therefore, in order to achieve higher secrecy we tol-
erate less active cheaters t. As before, reconstruc-
tion of the secret occurs with all of the shares.
• We define a strong threshold scheme (see Defini-
tion 2) where shares from any group of n− t′ nodes
are sufficient for the reconstruction, no group of
p = n − t′ − 1 nodes gains any information about
the state. Importantly, we show that according to
our definition, it is impossible to achieve a verifiable
strong threshold scheme, namely, a scheme which
satisfies the two above constraints and tolerates t
active cheaters at the same time.
• We relax the secrecy constraint of the strong
threshold scheme and construct a ramp
VHSS scheme (see Definition 3). In our ramp
verifiable scheme any n − t′ nodes can recon-
struct the secret, but any group of at most
p ≤ ⌊n−12 ⌋ does not have any information about
it. The scheme tolerates t active cheaters, where
t + t′ ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋ are constrained by the distance of
the underlying quantum error correcting code. We
denote it with {p, t, t′, n}-ramp VHSS.
In the case when n = nc > nq, our VHSS scheme allows us
to construct a scheme which extends verifiable quantum
secret sharing onto nodes with purely classical capabili-
ties, see Figure 2. That is, we use VQSS to share a quan-
tum secret with nq nodes, but we extend the sharing of
the classical key s onto nc > nq nodes. Therefore, some
of the nodes hold only classical shares but still participate
in hiding of the quantum secret. Due to the properties of
our protocol, this scheme can also lift the secrecy, such
that no set with p ≤ ⌊n−12 ⌋ nodes can learn the quantum
state before the reconstruction.
B. Implications for resource reduction.
Our scheme allows us to exploit CSS quantum error
correcting codes which encode a single-qubit quantum
state into single-qubit shares. Such codes are well-studied
in the literature and therefore, numerous schemes with
defined encoding and decoding exist [43, 44]. In the next
section we present examples of VHSS schemes based on
such codes. We remark that one could use approximate
error correction codes and in this way increase the num-
ber of active cheaters to 2t [24, 42]. However this solution
requires significantly more resources, see Section V.
III. RESOURCE REDUCTION
Our protocol reduces the number of qubits that need
to be controlled simultaneously by each node. To do
so, we adapt the protocol of [8], where the verification
procedure requires ancillas used in parallel, to a setting
where they can be used sequentially, i.e. one by one. This
way, each node needs control over 3n operational qubits
at a time. For comparison, the parallel execution of [8]
requires simultaneous control over Ω(r2n log(n)) qubits
per node, where r is the security parameter.
5Here we list a few examples of CSS codes leading to
VHSS schemes with single-qubit shares (also see Table I).
We express our examples in terms of maximum tolerable
number of active cheaters t. Note that for a particular
code there exists a trade-off between the number of active
cheaters and the total number of nodes.
For t = 1:
• {3, 1, 7}-VHSS. In this scheme n = nc = nq = 7
nodes hold both quantum and classical shares. The
scheme achieves maximum secrecy, i.e. no group of
p =
⌊
7−1
2
⌋
= 3 shares acquires any information
about the secret. All of the quantum shares are
single-qubit shares, and each node requires con-
trol over 21 qubits at a time for the verification
procedure. This example is based on the Steane’s
[[7, 1, 3]]2 code, encoding 1 qubit into 7 qubits, with
distance d = 3 [46]. In this scheme all shares are
necessary to reconstruct the secret.
Note that the Steane’s code without the classical
encryption would generate a VQSS scheme, where
no 2 nodes could gain any information about the
secret. However, due to the properties of the code,
a specific group of 3 nodes could still reconstruct
the secret. To compare, the existing construction
to achieve a purely quantum scheme with maximum
secrecy, requires individual shares of dimension q >
7.
• {⌊n−12 ⌋ , 1, n}-VHSS. In this scheme nq = 7 out of
n nodes hold quantum single-qubit shares and n =
nc > 7 hold classical shares. The scheme achieves
maximum secrecy. For the construction we use the
Steane’s [[7, 1, 3]]2 code and a classical scheme of
[37]. Therefore, in our scheme only 7 nodes need to
have quantum resources, but all of the n nodes can
participate in verifiable secret sharing of a quantum
state.
For t ≥ 1:
• {⌊n−12 ⌋ , t, n}-VHSS. We construct VHSS schemes
which tolerate more than one active cheater and
achieve maximum secrecy. All of the nodes hold
both quantum and classical shares (nq = nc = n),
and the quantum shares contain a single qubit. For
the construction we use higher-distance quantum
error correcting codes, for example toric codes and
color codes [43, 44], and VCSS scheme of [37]. We
present specific examples in Table I. Note that each
of those schemes can be expanded onto even larger
total number of nodes, by using a verifiable classical
secret sharing scheme with nc > nq.
• {p, t, t′, n}-ramp VHSS. Based on the same higher-
distance quantum error correcting codes [43, 44],
we construct examples of ramp schemes, see Tab. I.
All of the nodes hold quantum and classical shares,
however, only n − t′ are used to reconstruct the
secret.
IV. METHODS
A. Protocol
Our protocol is a hybrid between a classical scheme
(VCSS) and a quantum scheme (VQSS) to share the classi-
cal key s and the encrypted quantum state σQS , respec-
tively. In the following we summarize the principles of
these two protocols.
1. Verifiable Classical Secret Sharing
A verifiable classical secret sharing scheme is a scheme
which shares a classical secret of the dealer among nc
nodes in a verifiable way, using classical shares. The
scheme is such that pc nodes cannot gain any infor-
mation about the classical secret after coming together
(secrecy) and there are at most tc active non-adaptive
cheating nodes that the scheme tolerates. We repre-
sent the classical verifiable secret sharing protocol with
a triple (pc, tc, nc)-VCSS. Here we treat the VCSS scheme
as a secure black box which leaks no information about
the classical key s, even if the adversary has access to
quantum side information during the execution of VCSS.
VCSS schemes that are information theoretically secure
in the context of classical adversary have been presented
[3, 37, 38]. To the best of our knowledge, security of
protocols of [3, 37, 38] against an adversary with quan-
tum side information was never formalized. However, we
note that in Theorem 13 of [47] it was proven that any
classical protocol which is statistically secure in a univer-
sal composable (UC) sense, is also statistically UC-secure
against a quantum adversary.
In what follows, unless specified otherwise, we will con-
sider a classical VCSS protocol of [37]. This scheme is
information-theoretically secure with exponentially small
probability of error 2−Ω(r
′), where r′ is the security pa-
rameter. Here, for convenience, we choose r′ such that
r′ = r, where r is the security parameter of VHSS. The
protocol can tolerate up to tc < nc2 malicious nodes. In
particular, it also implies that pc = tc < nc2 . To the best
of our knowledge UC-security of this protocol was never
formalized. Therefore, here we add it as an assumption
that a VCSS protocol used in Protocol 1 is secure against
a quantum adversary in the information-theoretic sense.
Assumption 1. The VCSS scheme used to build Pro-
tocol 1, does not leak any information about the secret
key s to any set of pc nodes, except with probability ex-
ponentially small in the security parameter r, even in
the presence of quantum side information. That is, the
scheme is information theoretically secure in the presence
of a quantum adversary.
Formally, VCSS is a classical protocol in which the
dealer inputs a classical message s, which is shared among
the nodes. Let P be a set of size at most pc, and let QP
denote any quantum side information held by the nodes
6in set P at the end of the verification phase of the VHSS.
In principle, QP could be arbitrarily correlated with the
classical secret key s. However, Assumption 1 implies
that the state held by nodes in P carries no informa-
tion about the key s, other than what was known prior
to the beginning of the protocol, except with probability
exponentially small in the security parameter r.
2. Verifiable Quantum Secret Sharing
To construct our hybrid scheme we employ a
VQSS scheme which uses single-qubit shares. The
VQSS scheme summarized here is based on the results
of [8].
A verifiable quantum secret sharing scheme is a scheme
which shares a quantum state of the dealer among nq
nodes in a verifiable way, using quantum shares. The
scheme is such that pq nodes cannot gain any information
about the secret (secrecy) and there are at most tq non-
adaptive active cheating nodes that the scheme tolerates.
We denote such a scheme with a triple (pq, tq, nq)-VQSS.
To share a pure qubit state among nq nodes in a VQSS,
the nodes agree on (an efficiently decodable) [[nq, 1, d]]2
Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) error correcting code C.
Such a code encodes 1 qubit into nq qubits and has dis-
tance d. This means that the chosen CSS code is able
to correct tq ≤
⌊
d−1
2
⌋
arbitrary errors and pq ≤ d − 1
erasure errors.
The CSS code C used to perform the protocol, is de-
fined through two binary classical linear codes, V andW ,
satisfying V ∗ ⊆ W , where V ∗ is the dual code. Then,
C = V ∩FW is a set of states of nq qubits which yield a
codeword in V when measured in the standard basis, and
a codeword inW when measured in the Fourier basis [48].
An important property of a CSS code, which is useful for
the VQSS protocol, is the fact that certain logical opera-
tions Λ¯ can be implemented by applying local operations
Λ on the individual qubits held by the nodes and encoded
with C, i.e. Λ¯ = Λ⊗nq . This property, called transversal-
ity, means that specific logical operations can be applied
qubit-wise. In particular, the protocol uses the fact that
(i) applying a CNOT gate is tranversal; (ii) applying the
Fourier transform qubit-wise maps codewords of the code
C onto codewords of the dual code C˜; (iii) measurements
can be performed qubit-wise, but measurement outcome
of every qubit must be communicated classically to ob-
tain the result of the logical measurement.
In the VQSS protocol the dealer D encodes the quan-
tum secret state |ψ〉 using the code C and distributes it
to nq nodes. Next, each node i encodes her qubit into nq
further qubits and distributes those to every other node,
see Figure 3. This way the nodes create two levels of
encoding which can be represented as a tree. The sec-
ond level of encoding gives each node some control over
all the other shares, which allows honest nodes to check
consistency of all the shares.
The protocol aims to verify whether the shares (the
tree) create a codeword for which decoding is well-defined
with respect to the code C, without revealing any infor-
mation about the secret state of the dealer. This property
is formally defined in [8, 36] and is dubbed 2-GOOD. In-
tuitively, a 2-GOODV tree means that for all branches of
the tree which are held by honest nodes, upon measuring
their shares of the tree, there exists a unique codeword
in the code V that can be recovered. Since C = V ∩FW ,
to verify that the encoded tree is 2-GOODC , the verifi-
cation procedure first verifies that the tree is 2-GOODV
when measured in the standard basis, and then that it is
2-GOODW when measured in the Fourier basis.
We adapt the verification procedure from the work of
[8, 36] to run in a sequential way. In our procedure, to
verify that the encoded secret is 2-GOODV in the stan-
dard basis, the dealer and the nodes create auxiliary trees
initiated in a logical |+¯〉 state of the code C. Importantly,
these systems are distributed one at a time. Therefore,
each node needs to control 2n qubits at a time: n single-
qubit shares for the encoded secret state, and n single-
qubit shares for the auxiliary |+¯〉 state. We perform r
such checks, where r is the security parameter.
After this step, our protocol verifies that the encoded
secret is 2-GOODW in the Fourier basis. To do so, the
dealer and the nodes create new auxiliary trees initiated
in a logical |0¯〉 state of the code C. Here an important dif-
ference is that each of the auxiliary |0¯〉 states is first ver-
ified to be 2-GOODV as well, before applying the Fourier
transform. This step is necessary, because one wants to
make sure that the check in the Fourier basis does not
introduce bit flips in the standard basis (at this point
the check in standard basis for the secret state |ψ〉 has
already been performed). Verifying each |0¯〉 requires us-
ing extra n single-qubit shares per node and is repeated r
times. Therefore, each node needs to control 3n qubits at
this step: n single-qubit shares for the encoded secret, n
single-qubit shares for a |0¯〉 state, and additional n single-
qubit shares for the verification of |0¯〉. In comparison, in
[8, 36] all of the above steps are performed in parallel,
and effectively, each node needs to control Ω(r2n log(n))
at once.
In the verification phase the nodes publicly identify a
set of apparent cheaters B with probability exponentially
close to 1 in the security parameter r. Set B includes all
of the errors introduced by the dealer and errors intro-
duced by the cheating nodes until the end of the verifi-
cation phase. Note that there is no way to distinguish
the errors introduced by the dealer and those introduced
by the cheaters at this point. The dealer will pass ver-
ification as “honest” if |B| ≤ tq. On the other hand, if
|B| ≥ tq then the protocol aborts.
After the verification phase, the cheating nodes can
still corrupt their shares. Therefore, the reconstructor R
runs an error correction circuit and measures syndromes,
so that she can correct arbitrarily located errors intro-
duced by the cheaters after the verification. If for a
branch encoded by a particular node i there have been
more than tq errors, then R adds that node to the set
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Figure 3. The encoding tree for (2,1,7)-VQSS protocol with 7 nodes N1, . . . , N7, based on the Steane’s [[7, 1, 3]]2 code. The
figure represents the encoding done in the sharing phase by each of the nodes.
B of cheaters. Otherwise, R corrects errors and recon-
structs branch i. After reconstructing all branches, she
randomly picks n− 2tq shares which she has left, and re-
constructs the state of the dealer. Importantly, the size of
set B cannot be larger than 2tq at the end of the protocol.
This is because if all of the cheaters acted honestly dur-
ing the verification, the dealer D can introduce at most
tq errors to branches i and still pass the test. After the
verification, the cheaters can still introduce at most fur-
ther tq errors to branches i (by assumption). Therefore,
we have that |B| ≤ 2tq at the end of the protocol.
What is more, let CVQSS be the set of cheaters in the
VQSS and CVCSS the set of cheaters in VCSS. We assume
that if a node behaves maliciously in VQSS, it can also
behave maliciously in VCSS, and moreover CVQSS = CVCSS.
Therefore, we put t = tc = tq. Moreover, in our VHSS pro-
tocol we assume that the nodes have access to shared
public source of randomness. This can be realized, for
example, by running a classical verifiable secret sharing
protocol or multipartite coin flipping. We remark that
[36] points out solutions to reduce the classical commu-
nication complexity of generating public randomness. In
the following we will write [1, n] to denote registers of
nodes from 1 to n.
Protocol 1: Verifiable Hybrid Secret Sharing (VHSS)
Input: a qubit secret system |ψ〉 to share, CSS error correcting code C = V ∩ FW .
SHARING
Encryption
1. The dealer D encrypts her secret state |ψ〉 using quantum one-time pad with a classical key s, creating the state
σQS , see Equation (5).
2. D shares the classical key s among n nodes using a verifiable classical secret sharing VCSS protocol.
Encoding
1. D encodes σQ using C into Φ0,0[1,nq ], where σQ is the reduced state of σQS .
2. for i = 1, . . . , nq:
D sends Φ0,0i to node i.
Each node i encodes received systems using C into Φ0,0i[1,nq ] and sends j-th component Φ
0,0
ij
to node j.
VERIFICATION
Z basis
for ` = 0, m = 1, . . . , r:
1. D prepares |+¯〉0,m[1,nq ] =
∑
v∈V |v〉 using C.
82. for i = 1, . . . , nq:
D sends |+¯〉0,mi to node i.
Each node i encodes received systems using C into |+¯〉0,mi[1,nq ] and sends j-th component |+¯〉
0,m
ij
to node j.
3. Nodes use shared public randomness source and get public random value b0,m ∈R {0, 1}. Each node j:
(a) applies the CNOT gate to her shares depending on the value of b0,m (CNOT b0,m). That is, for every qubit
i, if b0,m = 0 the node does nothing, and if b0,m = 1 the node applies a CNOT gate with a qubit indexed by
m = 0 as a control to a qubit indexed by m = 1, . . . , r as a target:
∀i = 1, . . . , nq : CNOT b0,m
(
Φ0,0ij , |+¯〉
0,m
ij
)
(b) measures all systems indexed ` = 0, m = 1, . . . , r in the Z basis and broadcasts the result of the measurement.
X basis
for ` = 1, . . . , r:
4. D prepares |0¯〉`,0[1,nq ] =
∑
w∈W⊥ |w〉 using C.
5. for i = 1, . . . , nq:
D sends |0¯〉`,0i to node i.
Each node i encodes received systems using C into |0¯〉`,0i[1,nq ] and sends j-th component |0¯〉
`,0
ij
to node j.
for m = 1, . . . , r:
6. D prepares |0¯〉`,m[1,nq ] =
∑
w∈W⊥ |w〉 using C.
7. for all i = 1, . . . , nq:
D sends |0¯〉`,mi to node i.
Each node i encodes received systems using C into |0¯〉`,mi[1,nq ] and sends j-th component |0¯〉
`,m
ij
to node j.
8. Nodes use shared public randomness source and get public random values b`,m ∈R {0, 1}. Each node j:
(a) applies the CNOT gate to her shares depending on the value of b`,m (CNOT b`,m):
∀i = 1, . . . , nq : CNOT b`,m
(
|0¯〉`,0ij , |0¯〉
`,m
ij
)
(b) measures the m-th system in the Z basis and broadcasts the result of the measurement.
9. Nodes apply the Fourier transform F to all of their remaining shares, resulting in ΦF 0,0[1,nq ]j and
∣∣0¯F〉`,m
[1,nq ]j
for each
node j. Note that
∣∣0¯F〉 = ∑w∈W |w〉.
10. Nodes use shared public randomness source and get public random values b`,0 ∈R {0, 1}. Each node j:
(a) applies the CNOT gate to her shares depending on the value of b`,0 (CNOT b`,0):
∀i = 1, . . . , nq : CNOT b`,0
(
ΦF
0,0
ij ,
∣∣∣0¯F〉`,0
ij
)
(b) measures `-th system in the Z basis and broadcasts the result of the measurement.
11. (Decoding leaves Z basis) Broadcasted values in steps 3(b) and 8(b) yield words v`,m,i from code V , corresponding
to the second level of shares encoded by each node i. For each of the words, using classical decoding, the nodes:
(a) obtain a decoded value a`,m,i
(b) publically check on which positions the errors have occurred, denote these positions by B`,m,i. Nodes update
sets Bi = ∪`,mB`,m,i from the positions of errors which occurred in the systems encoded by node i. If |Bi| > t
then add i to a global set B.
12. (Decoding the root Z basis) The nodes arrange values a`,m,i into a`,m = {a`,m,1, . . . , a`,m,nq}. Word a`,m yields
a classical codeword from the code V and the nodes decode it using classical decoder of code V . They add the
positions on which an error occurred to the global set B.
13. (Decoding leaves X basis) Broadcasted values in step 10(b) yield words w`,0,i from code W , corresponding to the
second level of shares encoded by each node i. For each of the words, using classical decoding, the nodes:
(a) obtain a decoded value a`,0,i
9(b) publically check on which positions the errors have occurred, and update sets Bi and B as before. Sets Bi and
B are cumulative throughout the protocol.
14. (Decoding the root X basis) Nodes create a codeword a`,0 = {a`,0,1, . . . , a`,0,nq} and decode it using classical decoder
of code W . They add the positions on which an error occurred to the global set B. If |B| > t then reject the dealer
and abort. Otherwise continue.
15. Nodes apply an inverse Fourier transform F−1 to their remaining system and obtain global sharing of D secret, i.e.
each node j holds Φ0,0[1,nq ]j .
RECONSTRUCTION
1. Each quantum node j = 1, . . . , nq sends their shares to the reconstructor R. Moreover, all of the nc classical nodes
send their classical shares to R.
2. R reconstructs the classical secret key s using a decoder of VCSS.
3. For each share Φ0,0i[1,n] coming from encoding of node i /∈ B, R runs a circuit for code C which identifies errors. R
creates a set B˜i such that it contains Bi, Bi ⊆ B˜i. If |B˜i| ≤ t then errors are correctable, R corrects them and
decodes the i-th share, obtaining Φ0,0i . Otherwise, R adds i to the global set B.
4. For all i /∈ B, R randomly chooses nq − 2t shares Φ0,0i and applies an erasure-recovery circuit to them. R obtains
σR.
5. R decrypts σR using the classical key s and obtains |ψ〉.
B. Security
As discussed in previous sections, in the task of verifi-
able secret sharing we want to ensure that the dealer is
honest and that at the end of the protocol there will be a
well-defined state to be reconstructed. In this section we
prove the security of Protocol 1 against t non-adaptive
active cheaters. First we state useful lemmas about the
security of the VQSS protocol of [8], which we use as a
subroutine. For a detailed discussion we refer the reader
to [36]. We remark that we use an adapted version of
VQSS in the setting where we run the verification phase
sequentially, i.e. one ancilla at a time, whereas in [8] the
verification is performed in a parallel setting, i.e. all an-
cillas together. In Appendix A we prove that this fact
does not change security statements of the original VQSS.
Lemma 1 (soundness of VQSS). In the verifiable quan-
tum secret sharing protocol [8], either the honest parties
hold a consistently encoded secret or dealer is caught and
the protocol aborts with probability at least 1−2−Ω(r) (see
Equation (A26) in Appendix A).
Lemma 2 (completeness of VQSS). In the verifiable
quantum secret sharing protocol [8], if D is honest then
she passes the verification phase. Moreover, if R is also
honest she reconstructs D’s secret with probability at least
1− 2−Ω(r), where r is the security parameter (see Equa-
tion (A27) in Appendix A).
Using the above lemmas we now show that our
VHSS protocol, Protocol 1, is sound and complete.
Theorem 1 (soundness). In the verifiable hybrid secret
sharing protocol, Protocol 1, either the honest parties hold
a consistently encoded secret or dealer is caught and the
protocol aborts with probability at least 1− 2−Ω(r).
Proof. The soundness of the hybrid protocol is a com-
bination of soundness statements for the VQSS and
VCSS protocols. Formally, we need to bound the prob-
ability that one of the protocols fails,
Pr [failVQSS ∨ failVCSS] ≤ Pr [failVQSS] + Pr [failVCSS] . (1)
Let us first consider Pr[failVCSS]. Consider the protocol
of [37] whose probability of failure scales exponentially
with a security parameter r′. We choose r′ such that it
is equal to the security parameter of VQSS, r′ = r, and
therefore, Pr[failVCSS] ≤ 2−Ω(r).
On the other hand, by Lemma 1, the VQSS protocol
can fail with probability Pr[failVQSS] ≤ 2−Ω(r). Therefore,
we obtain
Pr [failVQSS ∨ failVCSS] ≤ 2−Ω(r). (2)
Theorem 2 (completeness). In the verifiable hybrid se-
cret sharing protocol, Protocol 1, if D is honest then she
passes the verification phase. Moreover, if R is also hon-
est she reconstructs D’s secret with probability at least
1− 2−Ω(r), where r is the security parameter.
Proof. For the first part of the theorem, observe that an
honest dealer always passes the verification phase. In-
deed, if the dealer is honest, she does not introduce any
errors, neither in the VQSS, nor in the VCSS protocol.
Moreover, by the assumption that active cheaters t are
always bounded by the number of tolerable errors, the
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VHSS protocol can always correct the arising errors and
the verification phase always accepts an honest dealer.
For the second part of the theorem, as in the sound-
ness statement, we calculate the probability that the
VHSS protocol fails with an honest dealer,
Pr
[
fail′VQSS ∨ fail′VCSS
] ≤ Pr [fail′VQSS]+ Pr [fail′VCSS] . (3)
For the classical VCSS protocol, as before, we consider
the protocol of [37]. By choosing the security parame-
ter of the classical protocol such that r′ = r, we obtain
Pr[fail′VCSS] ≤ 2−Ω(r). For the VQSS protocol, if R is also
honest, by Lemma 2 the probability that the verification
phase fails to identify the set B of apparent malicious
nodes, occurs with probability 2−Ω(r), see Appendix A
for details. Therefore,
Pr
[
fail′VQSS ∨ fail′VCSS
] ≤ 2−Ω(r). (4)
The encryption of the secret with a classical key
has significant consequences for the secrecy of the
VHSS scheme. We expand on it in the theorem below.
Note that in a VQSS [8] the secrecy property holds for any
pq ≤ 2tq nodes not being able to learn any information
about the dealer’s secret. However, in our VHSS scheme
we choose a classical scheme such that pc = p > 2tq, and
therefore, we lift the secrecy of the VQSS scheme (for a
detailed discussion see Sec. IVC1 below).
Theorem 3 (secrecy). In the verifiable hybrid secret
sharing protocol, Protocol 1, when D is honest and there
is at most t active cheaters in the verification phase, no
group of at most p = pc nodes learns anything about D’s
secret state throughout the protocol, where pc is the se-
crecy of the underlying classical scheme, except with prob-
ability exponentially small in the security parameter r.
Proof. The state describing the dealer’s encrypted quan-
tum secret and the randomly chosen classical encryption
key s = ab is
σQS =
∑
ab={0,1}2
1
4
XaZb |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ZbXa ⊗ |ab〉〈ab|S (5)
where Q is the quantum register of the dealer and S is the
classical register of the encryption key. By Assumption 1
the classical VCSS scheme is secure and does not leak any
information about the key s = ab to any set of pc nodes,
even in the presence of a quantum adversary, except with
probability exponentially small in the security parameter
r. Therefore, without the knowledge of the encryption
key s, the quantum state shared by the dealer as seen by
the rest of the nodes is maximally mixed,
σQ = trS(σQS) =
=
∑
ab={0,1}2
1
4
XaZb |ψ〉〈ψ|Q ZbXa =
1Q
2
. (6)
Before sending out the shares, the dealer applies an en-
coding EQ to the quantum register Q, so that
∀ |ψ〉 trS((EQ ⊗ 1S)(σQS)) = EQ(trS(σQS)) (7)
= EQ(σQ) =: ρ[1,nq ], (8)
where ρ[1,nq ] is an nq-qubit state sent by the dealer to
nq nodes. Importantly, since EQ and σQ, Equation (6),
are independent of |ψ〉, ρ[1,nq ] is also independent of |ψ〉.
Subsequently, the honest nodes do their encoding E , and
the malicious nodes can perform any (CPTP) operation
A that they desire. After this step, since E and A do not
depend on |ψ〉, the state of the nq nodes ρ′[1,nq ] is inde-
pendent of |ψ〉. In the classical scheme any group of pc
or fewer nodes has no information about s. Hence, the
partial state of any p = pc or fewer nodes in VHSS does
not depend on |ψ〉 and no information about the dealer’s
secret can be obtained, except with probability exponen-
tially small in r.
C. Verifiable Hybrid Schemes
Our protocol for VHSS, Protocol 1, leads to a variety
of schemes, depending on the parameters of the underly-
ing VQSS and VCSS protocols. In this section we discuss
the trade-offs between those parameters and specify what
schemes can be achieved with our protocol.
1. Verifiable schemes with maximum secrecy
In any VQSS scheme based on an error correcting code
with distance d, any group of at most d−1 nodes cannot
recover information about the secret. As mentioned be-
fore, this is due to the fact that a code of distance d can
correct up to d−1 erasures, and therefore any n− (d−1)
nodes can recover the state perfectly. In particular, it
implies that d − 1 nodes do not have any information
about the encoded state [19]. Quantum Singleton bound
[49] allows that n ≤ 2d − 1 for codes encoding a single
qubit. The construction of [8] saturates this inequality,
and therefore allows for attaining p =
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
, which we
refer to as maximum secrecy. However, this construction
uses systems of local dimension q > n and is based on
quantum Reed-Solomon codes [50].
To remedy this problem, we use a VQSS scheme based
on CSS codes with single-qubit shares, at the cost of re-
ducing secrecy. However, in our VHSS scheme, we com-
bine this with a classical scheme for which pc > 2tq.
Specifically, the VCSS protocol of [37] tolerates up to⌊
n−1
2
⌋
cheaters. This allows us to maximally lift the se-
crecy of the quantum scheme to the one attainable by
the VQSS of [8].
Lemma 3 (VHSS with maximum secrecy). Given a
[[n, 1, d]]2 CSS error correcting code and a VCSS scheme
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tolerating up to
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
classical active cheaters, Pro-
tocol 1 provides a way to construct a {⌊n−12 ⌋ , t, n}-
VHSS scheme with maximum secrecy p =
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
, toler-
ating t ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋ active cheaters, where all of the shares
are used to recover the quantum secret state.
Furthermore, we can explore other classical verifiable
schemes in the context of lifting secrecy in VHSS. In [38] a
classical VCSS scheme was presented, which has a strong
secrecy property: any pc > tc nodes cannot learn any
information about the classical secret (for comparison,
in the scheme of [37] pc = tc). However, this scheme
is able to tolerate up to tc ≤
⌊
nc−1
4
⌋
active classical
cheaters. Additionally, there exists a trade-off between
the number of nodes n, and the numbers of cheaters, i.e.
nc ≥ pc + 3tc + 1 (for details see Section 3.2 of [38]).
Consequently, this allows us to construct a VHSS scheme
lifting the secrecy beyond n2 , but at the cost of tolerating
less active cheaters t. Note that the classical scheme was
proven to be information theoretically secure against a
classical adversary, and by Assumption 1 we assume it
remains information theoretically secure against quan-
tum adversary. Moreover, the protocol was shown to
be perfectly secure, i.e. with zero probability of error.
Therefore, secrecy achieved in a VHSS which uses this
protocol as a subroutine, is exact and does not depend
on the security parameter r.
Lemma 4. Given a [[n, 1, d]]2 CSS error correcting code
and a VCSS scheme with n ≥ p + 3t + 1, Protocol 1 pro-
vides a way to construct a {p, t, n}-VHSS scheme. In
particular, to achieve p >
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
the scheme tolerates
t < 13 (n− p− 1) active cheaters. All of the shares are
used to recover the quantum secret state.
2. Threshold verifiable schemes
In the literature of secret sharing schemes, one often
considers schemes which have a property called threshold
[11, 12]. This property can be stated as the require-
ment that there exists p > 0, such that no subset of less
than p shares reveals any information about the state
of the dealer, while any subset of p + 1 shares allows
to perfectly reconstruct the state. Importantly, in such
schemes, there are no actively cheating nodes in the pro-
tocol.
Since in Protocol 1 we allow for the existence of ac-
tive cheaters, let us consider a definition of a threshold
scheme when there are t > 0 active cheaters. We will call
it a strong threshold scheme. In this case, in the recon-
struction phase the reconstructor R receives shares from
p+1 = n− t′ of the nodes. Among those, up to t of them
can be arbitrarily corrupted.
Definition 2 (strong threshold scheme). A strong
threshold (verifiable) secret sharing scheme is a scheme
where:
1. Any set of shares held by p = n− t′− 1 nodes does
not reveal any information about the secret state.
2. The reconstructor is able to perfectly reconstruct
the secret state with the set of shares from any
n− t′ nodes.
The above conditions hold in the presence of t > 0 active
cheaters.
In the literature of classical verifiable secret sharing a
similar definition of threshold is satisfied in the presence
of cheaters. For example, the scheme of [51] considers
a situation when honest shares are flagged. Therefore,
the reconstructor knows which n − t′ honest shares to
pick for the reconstruction. However, in our case, the
reconstructor does not know which shares are honest and
which are not. In such a situation, this definition cannot
be satisfied, which we show in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. It is impossible to construct a strong
threshold secret sharing scheme according to Definition 2.
Proof. From point 2 of Definition 2 we have that R must
be able to reconstruct the secret state from any n − t′
shares, in particular, she must be able to do so when
receiving n − t′ − t honest shares and t arbitrary ones.
This implies that she is able to recover the state from
the n − t′ − t honest shares alone. On the other hand,
from point 1 of Definition 2 no n−t′−1 shares reveal any
information, which implies that we must have n−t′−t >
n− t′−1. The only way to satisfy this inequality is when
t = 0.
Remark. Similarly to [51], it is possible to add a flag-
ging system to Protocol 1 using techniques from [24, 42].
Indeed, there, one uses a quantum authentication scheme
to flag whether the shares are honest or not. However, as
mentioned before, this happens at a significant qubit cost.
Since our objective is to reduce the number of qubits, we
explore a alternative direction in the next section.
3. Ramp verifiable schemes
In the previous section, we have seen that it is im-
possible to construct a strong threshold scheme which
tolerates active cheaters according to Definition 2. In
particular, this result also applies to verifiable schemes.
Therefore, here we allow for a gap between the number of
nodes p that obtain no information about the secret and
the number of nodes n − t′ necessary to reconstruct the
secret, and we introduce a definition of a ramp verifiable
scheme.
Definition 3. A ramp verifiable secret sharing scheme is
a scheme where any n− t′ nodes can reconstruct the se-
cret, but any p nodes cannot gain any information about
the secret state, for some p < n− t′− 1. The scheme can
verify the dealer in the presence of t active cheaters. We
denote such a scheme with {p, t, t′, n}-ramp.
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Relating to discussion in Section IVC1, we see that the
purely quantum VQSS scheme of [8] allows for construct-
ing a ramp scheme with secrecy p ≤ ⌊n−12 ⌋. However, for
qubit CSS codes this equality is not saturated. There-
fore, as before we use a classical scheme [37] to increase
the value of p (lift the secrecy) as compared to the purely
quantum ramp scheme. We obtain the following result.
Lemma 5 (Ramp VHSS). Given a [[n, 1, d]]2 CSS er-
ror correcting code and a VCSS scheme tolerating up to⌊
n−1
2
⌋
classical active cheaters, Protocol 1 provides a
way to construct a {p, t, t′, n}-ramp VHSS scheme with
p =
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
, where the quantum state can be recovered
with shares from any n − t′ nodes in the presence of t
active cheaters, and t+ t′ ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋.
By putting t′ = 0 we require reconstruction with all of
the shares and recover the result of Lemma 3. Note that
if we are interested in maximizing the number of cheaters
and minimizing the number of the shares necessary for
reconstruction, we can put t = t′ =
⌊
d−1
4
⌋
.
V. OUTLOOK
We presented a protocol which achieves the task of
sharing a quantum secret in a verifiable way, which re-
duces the number of qubits necessary to realize the proto-
col. In our scheme each node requires an n-qubit quan-
tum memory and a workspace of at most 3n qubits in
total. By combining classical encryption with a quan-
tum scheme we showed that we can construct a variety
of verifiable hybrid schemes attaining maximum secrecy.
We proved that our protocol is secure in the presence of
active non-adaptive adversary.
We remark that there is a dependence between the
number of cheaters tolerated by a verifiable secret shar-
ing protocol and quantum resources necessary to real-
ize it. The number of cheaters can be increased to 2t
by using approximate quantum error correction based on
quantum authentication schemes [24, 42]. Indeed, in [9]
the authors showed that by employing quantum authen-
tication techniques, the VQSS scheme of [8] can tolerate
up to n2 malicious nodes. In this case, the power of the
verification scheme increases up to the number of tolera-
ble erasures of the code, and one can effectively tolerate
twice as many malicious nodes. However, authentication
schemes typically require another level of error correc-
tion, where the size of the code scales exponentially in
the security parameter of the authentication. Therefore,
such schemes increase the number of qubits required to
realize the protocol.
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Appendix A: Security of the VQSS scheme [8] in the
sequential setting
Proof of Lemma 1. Here we state the soundness of the
VQSS protocol. Since we use the VQSS in the sequential
setting instead of the original parallel one, we restate
security in the sequential setting. Our techniques are
inspired by the approach suggested in [8, 36].
To prove the soundness of the VQSS protocol, we bound
the probability that the state held by the nodes after the
verification phase is close to a codeword in C = V ∩FW
with at most t errors on the set of malicious shares in the
verification phase, or that the protocol aborts, and there-
fore, the dealer is caught. V denotes a space spanned by
{|v〉 : v ∈ V C}, where V C is a classical code space. Sim-
ilarly, FW is spanned by {F |w〉 : w ∈WC}, where F is
the Fourier transform and WC is a classical code space
such that the dual code V C∗ ⊆WC .
Let Vt be the space of 2-GOODV trees in the compu-
tational basis, defined according to the Proposition 2.10
of [36]. In particular, if one measures a state |v〉 ∈ Vt the
outcome is a codeword in the code space V Ct , where V Ct
is the space of strings having at most t errors on the set
of malicious shares, compared to a string in the classical
code V C . Moreover, let FWt be the space of 2-GOODW
trees in the Fourier basis. In other words, Vt and FWt
are spaces of codes V and W with at most t errors on
fixed positions of malicious shares. We will first look at
the check for the Z basis, i.e. checking whether the state
held by the nodes is in Vt.
Without loss of generality, we can decompose the state
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of the nodes after the sharing phase in spaces Vt and V ⊥t ,
ρsh =
∑
i
qi |ψi〉〈ψi| , (A1)
with |ψi〉 = ai
∣∣∣ψ˜i〉 + bi ∣∣∣ψ˜⊥i 〉 , where ∣∣∣ψ˜i〉 ∈ Vt and∣∣∣ψ˜⊥i 〉 ∈ V ⊥t . In words, the state after the sharing phase
is a mixture of pure states which have components in Vt
and V ⊥t .
Moreover, let ρver(Z) be the state of all the nodes after
the verification phase in the Z basis.
We will show that
“conditioned on not aborting, the state ρver(Z) is close
to a codeword in the space Vt, or the verification phase
aborts with high probability”.
By definition of the space Vt, ρver(Z) belongs to Vt, if by
measuring it in the Z basis one obtains with certainty an
outcome corresponding to a string v ∈ V Ct . Therefore,
we will quantify “the state ρver(Z) is close to a codeword
in the space Vt” with a high probability of getting an
outcome v ∈ V Ct when measuring ρver(Z). Alternatively,
one can think of a situation in which first a measurement
on the initial state is performed and then the verification
takes place. To prove the security statement we will use
a tool called “quantum-to-classical” reduction, which re-
lates the statistics obtained in the two situations. That
is, in order to compute the probability of aborting in the
verification phase of the VQSS protocol or the probability
that the resulting state is in V ∩ FW , we will analyze
the situation in which the state is measured before the
verification.
Probability of aborting. In order to evaluate prob-
ability of aborting, we will follow the solution suggested
in [36] for the parallel execution of the VQSS and we will
show how to use this result for the sequential setting. To
do so, let us fix a round (0,m), with m > 0. For this
round we can use the “quantum-to-classical” reduction.
It states that the two following situations are equivalent:
(i) the honest nodes measure their shares of ρver(Z) in
the standard basis at the end of the verification phase;
(ii) the honest nodes measure their shares of |ψsh〉 and an
m-th ancilla right after they have been distributed, i.e.
before running the verification of round (0,m). Formally,
∀mM0MmCNOT b0,m0,m =MmCNOT b0,m0,m MmM0
(A2)
where M0 and Mm denote measurements of the state
of the nodes and m-th ancilla respectively. CNOT b0,m0,m
denotes a CNOT gate performed with |ψsh〉 as a con-
trol and the m-th ancilla as target. Note that if the
nodes perform measurements right after the shares are
distributed (situation (ii)) they only need to handle clas-
sical data from that moment on. Therefore, “quantum-to-
classical” reduction means that the verification phase of
the quantum VQSS protocol (Q-protocol) can be reduced
to a corresponding verification in a classical protocol (C-
protocol). That is to say, measurement outcomes in Q-
protocol and C-protocol are exactly the same and the
moment when the measurement is performed does not
change the behavior of the protocol. Since the measure-
ment is performed in the standard basis and the CNOT
gate acts as a bit flip in the standard basis, the two op-
erations commute.
Let us look now at the sequential execution of Q-
protocol and C-protocol. Expanding the above depen-
dence onto m sequential rounds, we obtain
M0MrCNOT b0,r0,r . . .M1CNOT b0,10,1 =
=MrCNOT b0,r0,r Mr . . .M1CNOT b0,10,1 M1M0
(A3)
In particular, this means that the probability of abort-
ing in the sequential Q-protocol can be reduced to con-
sidering the probability of aborting in the sequential C-
protocol,
Pr[¬abortQ] = Pr[¬abortC ]. (A4)
Consider the corresponding C-protocol for round (` =
0,m): the nodes have classical bit strings v0,0 and v0,m.
They wish to verify whether v0,0 is a string in the space
V Ct . To do so the (honest) nodes compute bit-wise
v0,m + b0,mv0,0 according to public random bit b0,m.
They broadcast the result and create the set of appar-
ent cheaters B.
In the C-protocol, the string v0,0 can either be a string
in V Ct or not. This depends on the shared state (A1),
and therefore happens with probabilities
Pr[v0,0 ∈ V Ct ] =
∑
i
qi|ai|2 =: a, (A5)
Pr[v0,0 /∈ V Ct ] =
∑
i
qi|bi|2 =: b, (A6)
respectively. Indeed, the probability that any of the |ψi〉
from (A1) yields a string from V Ct (resp. not in V Ct ) is
given by |ai|2 (resp. |bi|2). In the case when v0,0 is a string
in V Ct , the verification always passes and we have that
Pr[¬abortC |v0,0 ∈ V Ct ] = 1. On the other hand, if v0,0
is not a string in V Ct , then for all bit strings v0,m there
exists at most one bit b0,m such that v0,m + b0,mv0,0 is a
string in V Ct . Since b0,m is chosen independently of v0,m
and v0,0, and uniformly at random, the probability that
v0,m + b0,mv0,0 a codeword is at most 12 . Since the above
is true for any value of v0,m, in particular it must be true
even if v0,m depends on the previous rounds 1, . . . ,m−1.
Therefore, the overall probability p that the verification
phase of the C-protocol does not abort given that v0,0 is
not a string in V Ct , is at most
p = Pr[¬abortC |v0,0 /∈ V Ct ] ≤ 2−r. (A7)
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The above consideration allows us to write that the prob-
ability of the C-protocol not aborting is
Pr[¬abortC ] = Pr[v0,0 ∈ V Ct ]Pr[¬abortC |v0,0 ∈ V Ct ]
+ Pr[v0,0 /∈ V Ct ]Pr[¬abortC |v0,0 /∈ V Ct ].
(A8)
Since Pr[¬abortQ] = Pr[¬abortC ], Equation (A4), in the
Q-protocol we have
Pr [¬abortQ] = a+ pb. (A9)
Probability of measuring a string in V Ct .
Now our objective is to evaluate
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortQ
]
. By “quantum-to-classical”
reduction argument (A3), we know that the C-protocol
should yield the same statistics as the Q-protocol,
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortQ
]
= Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortC
]
.
(A10)
From the considerations about the probability of abort-
ing, using the rules of probability, we can compute
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortQ
]
=
a
a+ pb
. (A11)
Now let us combine the statements about probability
of aborting and probability of measuring a string in V Ct .
Using the “quantum-to-classical” reduction, we can for-
mally reformulate the initial statement “conditioned on
not aborting, the state ρver(Z) is close to a codeword in
the space Vt, or the verification phase aborts with high
probability” as
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortQ
]
> 1− δ
or
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortQ
] ≤ 1− δ
and Pr[abortQ] ≥ 1− 2−rδ
(A12)
where δ is a threshold for probability of measuring a
string from V Ct . Indeed, using equations (A9) and (A11)
we can express Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortQ
]
as a function of
Pr[¬abortQ],
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortQ
]
=
Pr[¬abortQ]− p
Pr[¬abortQ](1− p) (A13)
Now, either Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortQ
]
> 1− δ and the first
condition is satisfied, or Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortQ
] ≤ 1− δ
and using (A13) we get
Pr[¬abortQ] ≤ p
δ
≤ 2
−r
δ
, (A14)
and therefore Pr[abortQ] ≥ 1− 2−rδ .
In analogy to the above reasoning, one can construct
an argument for a check in the X basis. Therefore, we
can write
Pr
[
w0,0 ∈WCt |¬abortQ
]
> 1− δ′
or
Pr
[
w0,0 ∈WCt |¬abortQ
] ≤ 1− δ′
and Pr[abortQ] ≥ 1− 2−rδ′
(A15)
where δ′ is a threshold for probability of measuring a
string from WCt .
Furthermore, in the protocol we verify that each of the
|0¯〉 ancilla states is sufficiently close to space Vt before
running the verification in the X basis. Let V 0Ct be a
subspace of the code V Ct whose codewords are entries
in the logical |0¯〉, i.e. 0 + (WC∗)t, where the dual code
(WC∗)t ⊆ V Ct . Then V 0t is a subspace of Vt, such that
V 0t is spanned by {|v〉 : v ∈ V 0Ct }. Formally, we verify
that conditioned on not aborting, the actual state of the
ancilla is close to a codeword in V 0t , or the verification
phase aborts with high probability,
Pr
[
v ∈ V 0Ct |¬abortQ
]
> 1− δ′′
or
Pr
[
v ∈ V 0Ct |¬abortQ
] ≤ 1− δ′′
and Pr[abortQ] ≥ 1− 2−rδ′′
(A16)
where δ′′ is a threshold for probability of measuring a
string from V 0Ct . Since there are r of ancilla checks, the
probability that measuring all of the |0¯〉 states yield a
codeword from space V 0Ct can be written as
Pr
[
r∧
`=1
v`,0 ∈ V 0Ct
∣∣∣¬abortQ] ≥ 1− rδ′′. (A17)
The purpose of having |0¯〉 ∈ V 0t is that using these ancil-
las for verification in the X basis will not introduce bit
flip errors in the Z basis. In other words, any state in Vt
remains in Vt after its verification in the X basis, as long
as we use ancillas |0¯〉 ∈ V 0t .
We will now make a statement about the whole verifi-
cation phase. Let the state of the nodes after the verifi-
cation in the Z basis have the form
ρver(Z)|bZ 6=0 = αρVt + βρV ⊥t (A18)
where ρVt is a mixture of pure states in Vt and ρV ⊥t is
a mixture of pure states in V ⊥t . Here we condition the
state on the fact that the public random bits bZ used
in the verification in the standard basis (i.e. b0,m for
m = 1, . . . , r) are all different than 0, i.e. that at least
one CNOT gate is performed. In this case, measuring
the state of the nodes after the CNOT, projects it either
on Vt or V ⊥t . It happens with probabilities α and β,
respectively.
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Similarly, after the consecutive verification in the X
basis, the state of the nodes will be
ρver(Z,X)|bZ ,bX 6=0,|0¯〉∈V 0t =
= αα′ρVt∩FWt + αβ
′ρV ⊥t ∩FWt
+ β
(
α′′ρVt∩FW⊥t + β
′′ρV ⊥t ∩FW⊥t
)
,
(A19)
where we additionally condition the state on the fact that
bits bX used for verification in theX basis are all different
than zero (i.e. at least one CNOT was performed in the
X basis). Moreover, we condition it on the fact that |0¯〉
ancillas used for verification in the X basis are in V 0t .
Assuming the first lines of Equations (A12) and (A15),
we get that
αα′ + αβ′ > 1− δ (A20)
αα′ + βα′′ > 1− δ′ (A21)
The first line implies that β(α′′ + β′′) ≤ δ and therefore,
β ≤ δ. Using this in the second line we get that αα′ ≥ 1−
δ−δ′. Now, αα′ is exactly the probability that measuring
ρver(Z,X)|bZ ,bX 6=0,|0¯〉∈V 0t in the Z basis yields a string in
V Ct and measuring it in the X basis yields a string in
WCt . Therefore, we get,
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct ∧ w0,0 ∈WCt |¬abort, bZ , bX 6= 0, |0¯〉 ∈ V 0t
]
≥ 1− δ − δ′.
(A22)
Now we will lower-bound the probability
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct ∧ w0,0 ∈WCt |¬abort
]
i.e. remove the
conditioning on bZ , bX 6= 0, |0¯〉 ∈ V 0t from the above
probability expression. Let us evaluate,
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct ∧ w0,0 ∈WCt |¬abort
]
=
= Pr
[
bZ , bX 6= 0 ∧ |0¯〉 ∈ V 0t |¬abort
]
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct ∧ w0,0 ∈WCt |¬abort, bZ , bX 6= 0, |0¯〉 ∈ V 0t
]
+
+ Pr
[¬(bZ , bX 6= 0) ∨ |0¯〉 /∈ V 0t |¬abort]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤r2−r+Pr[|0¯〉/∈V 0t |¬abort]≤r2−r+rδ′′
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct ∧ w0,0 ∈WCt |¬abort,¬(bZ , bX 6= 0), |0¯〉 /∈ V 0t
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
,
(A23)
where we assumed the first line of Equation (A16) to
bound Pr
[|0¯〉 /∈ V 0t |¬abort]. To sum up, the conjunction
of
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct |¬abortQ
]
> 1− δ
Pr
[
w0,0 ∈WCt |¬abortQ
]
> 1− δ′
Pr
[
r∧
`=1
v`,0 ∈ V 0Ct
∣∣∣¬abortQ] ≥ 1− rδ′′ (A24)
implies that
Pr
[
v0,0 ∈ V Ct ∧ w0,0 ∈WCt |¬abort
] ≥
≥ (1− δ − δ′) + r(2−r + δ′′)(δ + δ′). (A25)
Therefore, either Equation (A25) is satisfied or at least
one of the equations in (A24) not satisfied. In the latter
case, Equations (A12), (A15) and (A16) imply that
Pr[abort] ≥ 1−max
{
2−r
δ
,
2−r
δ′
,
2−r
δ′′
}
(A26)
Proof of Lemma 2. If the dealer is honest, the size of set
B must be at most t – there is at most t malicious nodes
and only real malicious nodes are accused of cheating.
Therefore, the verification phase will always lead to ac-
cepting an honest dealer.
If R is also honest then we must calculate the probabil-
ity that the verification phase fails to identify the set B
of apparent malicious nodes. In this case, the reconstruc-
tion phase could take inconsistent shares to reconstruct
the original state of the dealer. We can use the “quantum-
to-classical” reduction argument again (see [36] and the
argument above) and argue about the probability of error
for the classical protocol. An error in the classical case
can occur when any of the checks for Z or X basis, or
checks of |0¯〉, lead to consistent strings on V Ct , FWCt or
V C0t . Similarly to the argument above, the probability
of that occurring is
c = (2 + r)2
−r (A27)
Let us now look at the reconstruction phase of the
quantum protocol to bound the fidelity of the output
state. When the reconstructor is honest, she first applies
a decoding operator to each branch i corresponding to
node i /∈ B. The operator corrects errors without knowl-
edge of the positions which carry errors (i.e. it corrects
arbitrary errors). Therefore, whenever in qubits corre-
sponding to branch i /∈ B there is no more than t errors,
the decoding will identify the errors and correct them. In
the case when there are more than t errors in a branch
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i, the procedure will leave that branch untouched and
the reconstructor will update the set B with position i.
Secondly, the honest reconstructor applies an erasure-
recovery circuit to randomly chosen n−2t positions from
i /∈ B. In the case when all of the errors are correctly
identified in B, the erasure-recovery corrects for n − 2t
erasure errors, i.e. missing qubits of the dealer and mali-
cious nodes, and outputs the original state of the dealer.
Since the verification phase can fail to identify the set B
with probability c, we have:
ρrec = (1− c) |ψ〉〈ψ|+ cρ˜R, (A28)
where ρ˜R is an arbitrary state that depends on the action
of the malicious nodes. Let us define the fidelity of the
reconstructed state as F = Tr [ρrec |ψ〉〈ψ|R]. Using lin-
earity properties of the trace together with the fact that
quantum states have non-zero trace, we have that
F = Tr [((1− c) |ψ〉〈ψ|+ cρ˜) |ψ〉〈ψ|]
=(1− c) Tr [|ψ〉〈ψ| |ψ〉〈ψ|] + c Tr [ρ˜ |ψ〉〈ψ|]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥1− c.
(A29)
